Random Selection, Republican Self-Government, and Deliberative Democracy

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In 1439, the humanist Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444), Chancellor of the Florentine Republic and doubtless the most celebrated European intellectual of his time, published a short treatise in Greek: On the Florentine Constitution. Florence was at the height of its splendor and power: during this period, it had seen the invention of perspective in art; it had also witnessed the development of new techniques in textile manufacturing and banking and, most important for our purpose, the rise of civic humanism. In this essay, Bruni positively valued Florence, in an Aristotelian vein, as a mixed constitution. The social composition of its citizenry, he claims, results from two principles of exclusion: noble families (the magnates) are excluded from the most important offices (this is the anti-aristocratic principle), and manual workers are excluded from the political life (this is the anti-democratic principle). Three other main elements sustain the democratic dimension: the ideal of liberty (vivere libero, vivere civile, vivere politico) is at the core of its institutions and political system; offices are held for short-term periods, usually two to four months, including the most important of them, the Signoria; those who hold the offices are chosen through random selection (tratta). The executive, legislative councils, and part of the judiciary are chosen in this manner.

On December 11, 2004, after nearly 12 months of deliberation, a Citizen Assembly, selected by lot from the citizens of British Columbia in Canada, presented its Final Report on Electoral Change to the B.C. Legislature. It proposed to change the electoral system by introducing more proportionality (replacing the existing electoral system, the so-called First-Past-the-Post, with a new Single-Transferable Vote system). This recommendation was then put to the electorate-at-large in a referendum held concurrently with the 2005 provincial election. Gordon Gibson, the creator of British Columbia’s Citizen Assembly and councilor of the Prime Minister, justified the initiative in the following manner:

We are...adding new elements to both representative and direct democracy. These new elements differ in detail but all share one thing in common. They add to the mix a new set of representatives, different from those we elect. As things stand now, both streams of decision-making are highly influenced – almost captured – by experts and special interests. The idea of deliberative democracy is essentially to import the public interest, as represented by random panels, as a muscular third force. The traditional representatives we elect are chosen by majority consensus, for an extended period, as professionals, with unlimited jurisdiction to act in our name. The new kinds we are talking about are chosen at random, for a short period, as ordinary citizens for specified and limited purposes.

The decision seems only to have been the prelude to a larger wave of similar experiments. Ontario, the most populous Canadian State, followed British Columbia’s example in 2005. Two further examples can be mentioned. On June 4, 2006, in the evening, 131 citizens selected by lot voted for the socialist candidate in the town hall elections in Marousi, a medium-sized town near Athens. Throughout the day, they had listened to those who wanted to become candidates, and, using facilitators in order to have the best possible deliberation, they had discussed the suitability of the candidates in a general assembly and in small groups.
At the end of the day, the person who received the most votes was actually the one who was least known to the citizens. The local socialist party (the PASOK) organized this process following a proposal made by Georges Papandreou (who was the PASOK national leader and Socialist International’s President at that time). In the autumn of 2006, the French presidential campaign was troubled for a few weeks by a proposal made by Ségolène Royal, the socialist candidate. Ms. Royal wanted to set up citizen juries to evaluate politicians’ actions. Ms. Royal, had promised that, if elected, she would reform the French Constitution through a process in which the Legislative Assembly and a citizen assembly selected by lot would work together to prepare a revised text that would then be put to a referendum. Many different participatory and deliberative devices where random selection plays a role have been created in the last two decades, in very different contexts.

It would be ridiculous to strictly compare Early Renaissance Florence and British Columbia: their contexts, institutions and political cultures are completely different. Nevertheless, two important questions arise. Can we claim that the recent interest in random selection marks the resurgence of a democratic tradition that was invented in Athens during the classical period and reinvented in the Italian city-states? What does this parallel teach us about random selection and deliberation? In what follows, I will proceed in two steps. First I will briefly describe the Republican self-government based on random selection that characterized the Florentine Republic and explore the ambiguous role that deliberation played in it. I will then contrast this polity with current experiments in deliberative democracy based on randomly selected mini-publics and will discuss what this reveals about random selection and deliberative democracy.

Random Selection and Republican Self-Government in Early Renaissance Florence

As we know from the seminal works of Baron, Pocock, Skinner, and Hankins, the Florentine notion of libertas has been decisive in the formation of modern political thought. Nicolai Rubinstein has shown that that the ideal of the vivere libero included not only independence from foreign powers, the rule of law, political equality among citizens (or at least among those who were full citizens) and the right to take an active part in public affairs, but also the right to participate directly in the government of the Republic.

Random Selection of Public Office Holders

In fact, most of the magistrates were randomly selected and held their offices for only a few months. This feature has been well documented by Renaissance and contemporary historians and has recently raised interest in political theory. From 1282 onwards, the Signoria, which was similar to what we would now call an executive, was the most important power in the city. Its members represented the various corporations (the arti) through a complex system of quotas. It was in charge of foreign policy, controlled the administrative bodies and had the right to initiate the laws of the Republic. Up to 1494, when a Major Council was created following the Venetian model, the Signoria decided when the two legislative councils had to meet. Even though this institutional system was continually evolving, its basic features remained the same until the end of the fifteenth century. During this period, some of the most important political debates in the city concerned the repartition of political and administrative positions among the various corporations and the role of sortition in that process. From 1328 onwards, the majority of official positions were attributed by lot (called la tratta). The candidates’ names were put in pouches (borse) and sortition provided the
way of selecting those who would be in charge for a certain period. The members of the Signoria were selected by lot, and, during the republican period, most of the political and administrative offices were attributed according to a similar process.

The selection process actually took four steps. In the first one, selection committees in each neighborhood had to choose those citizens who were considered apt enough to hold the office, according strict personal and political criteria. During the second phase, the list of those who had succeeded (the so-called nominati) was scrutinized by a city commission composed of preeminent citizens, the arroti. The names of those who achieved a qualified majority (two thirds of the ballots, in a process called squittino) were put in leather pouches (imborsati). For those offices that were attributed through quotas, there were different pouches for the major and the minor guilds. Sortition itself only took place in the third step when the names were withdrawn from the pouches. Ad hoc officials, the accopiatori, were in charge at this crucial moment. The names of those who had not been selected were left in the pouches for the next sortition. After an unusual or important political event (such as a revolution or a drastic change within the regime) had taken place, a new squittino would be organized before the old pouches were empty. The last step consisted of eliminating the names of those who had been selected but who did not fit the necessary criteria for office (the so-called procedure of the divieti.) If any of those chosen still owed taxes, had served in a similar capacity in the recent past, had been sentenced in respect to certain crimes, had a parent in a similar position or already held an other important office, they would not be allowed to take up their posts.

Sortition and Deliberation

What was the relation between sortition, election and deliberation in the Florentine Republic? It was very peculiar and very different both from how it operated in Athens and how it is used in our modern democracies. In the Attic city-state, offices were allocated either by random selection or, for the most important 10%, by election. In the Florentine system, election and sortition were combined. In addition, we have to be aware of the different political values denoted by the term “election” in different historical periods and political cultures. Modern readers see elections as a process by which the grassroots select those who will then speak and act for them. Ancient Athenians would have had a similar understanding. Conversely, elections were a top-down process in Florence, a kind of co-option of worthy citizens by the political elite or “inner circle” where the political power of the state was concentrated. This only changed with the formation of the Major Council in 1494.

The meaning of the word “deliberation” also varies in respect to the language and context in which it is used. In English, it usually implies a careful discussion of all sides of a question. It is with reference to this meaning that the concept of “deliberative democracy” was created, and it is only in specific contexts that deliberation necessarily leads to a decision – most notably with the trial jury. In early Renaissance Italy, the word had quite a different meaning. It implied the decision of a collective body, but not necessarily a collective discussion. Francesco Guicciardini, a famous intellectual and politician who was Machiavelli’s contemporary and one of the first theoreticians of representative government, wrote for example in 1512: “I easily accept that laws could be decided in the [Great] council (che la deliberazione ne sia in consiglio), because they are something quite universal and concern every city member; but I like the fact that it is impossible to discuss them publicly, or only following the orders of the Signoria and in favor of what it proposes – because if
anybody were allowed the freedom to persuade or dissuade others, this would lead to great confusion."17

Discussions on public matters were very lively and quite important for the decision-making process in the Florentine Commune. Where did they take place? (a) There were political discussions in non-public places, for example in the big palazzi belonging to the most important families in the city. Such discussions also took place in spaces intermediately between the private and the public arenas: public meetings of a kind were regularly organized on the banks which existed at the bottom of the palazzi, and in the open shops and the loggie in front of them. In this respect, the Florentine inner city was in some way similar to the Athenian agora or the Roman forum. (b) The general assembly of the people, called the parlamento, never had the role it had played in Athens. It had no regular meetings, was not an institution in which one could deliberate, and usually had a plebiscitary function. (c) A lot of discussions took place in the guilds, the arti, which were a basic feature of the medieval republican system. The arti could make decisions for themselves, had specific institutions, and could partly designate candidates for offices. Their meetings were only open to members. With the early Renaissance, their importance strongly decreased and they gave place to a more unified political body. (d) Discussions leading to decisions also took place in the numerous electoral commissions that selected those whose names were to be put in the pouches. These were not open public affairs, as we previously noted, except during the short period at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth when the Major Council (consiglio maggiore) was in place. (e) Most of the offices – including the most important, the Signoria – were collegial. This meant that although discussion took place, again, it was not in public. Executive decisions were taken in these offices. (f) The two legislative councils, selected by lot within much larger lists than the one which was used for the Signoria, had the power to pass or refuse the bills proposed by the executive; but they could not propose any bill by themselves and it was forbidden to criticize the proposals.18 The only speeches allowed were in favor of the measure in hand and it is this arrangement that Guicciardini advocated in the above quotation. In addition, the sessions of the legislative councils were not public, i.e. open to all citizens. (g) A much deeper discussion took place in advisory bodies called pratiche, which the Signoria could call at will and which were selected by the most important political leaders. The quality of discussion was high in these bodies, they served to enlighten the public mind and forge a majority consensus, but they took no decisions and were not open to the public.19 Their role was a crucial factor in the progressive loss of republican substance from the Florentine institutions at the time of the early Renaissance, for they heralded the emergence of a political class that was dedicated to politics on a full-time basis, that was hegemonic in the electoral commissions, and whose members could regularly pass from one public office to another.

Politics, Republican Self-Government and Democracy

In this complex system, deliberation, in the sense of public discussion that is used in most theories of deliberative democracy, was an essential dimension. Even though none were democracies, it is for this reason that we can claim that the Florentine Republic along with the other Italian communes that developed similar systems “reinvented politics.” As Moses I. Finley,20 Cornelius Castoriadis21 and Christian Meier22 suggest, politics is something very peculiar and has not existed in all societies and at all times; it implies not just the struggle for state power, which takes place in every state society, but also the existence of a public sphere.23 The articulation of deliberation and decision-making in Florence was
The decision-making bodies were not open to the public; the randomly selected legislature could take decisions but could not discuss the bills in question; the general assembly of the people could decide but not deliberate; and the body in which discussion was most lively, the *pratiche*, was co-opted by the inner-circle and was neither open to the wider public nor entitled to take decisions. Sortition in this context had therefore an ambiguous relation to deliberation.

In fact, its main function was to ensure an impartial resolution of conflicts between the different factions that deeply divided the Republic. However, this was not its only value for it also played a crucial role in establishing citizen self-government. Due to random selection and the rapid rotation of the offices (usually from two to six months), nearly all those who had the full citizenship were able, in theory, to have regular access to public office. Citizenship was essentially defined through the membership of one of the twenty-one officially recognized guilds. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, this included between 7,000 and 8,000 persons from a population of about 90,000 people. In 1343, three quarters of the citizenry were nominated to take part in the *squittino* for the *Signoria*; around 800 passed the test and were *imborsati* – and were thus destined to hold one of the major offices in the years following the vote. In 1411, at the time of the birth of civic humanism, more than 5,000 citizens were *nominati* and more than 1,000 *imborsati*. The Major Council created in 1494 had around 3,000 members. Apart from the highest executive positions there were plenty of other offices that used sortition as a means of selection during this period. The rule was clear: the more important the office, the harder the competition for being *imborsati*.

Florentine citizenship was clearly restricted to a minority of the population. The ratio of full citizens to population was larger than that of Venice during the same period, smaller than that of classical Athens, and comparable with the proportion of full citizens to the population of Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth century. Florence was not a democracy in the meaning we presently give to the term. It was not self-government by all and, as we have seen previously, a large part of the power tended to be *de facto* in the hands of the inner-circle during much of this period. Despite this, it was more self-government than representative government and, compared to other regimes of its time, it embodied to some extent the ideal of self-government by the many – *governo largo*. The discrepancy between the constitutional ideal and the political practice in this matter, moreover, was probably no greater than in a modern democracy. The ideal of the *vivere libre*, which was at least partly embedded in the real life of the Republic of Florence, included the equal participation of the full citizen in public life and an equal – and real – opportunity to hold a public office. This ideal was realized through random selection and the rapid rotation of offices – techniques that were used in order to avoid or limit any division between state power and the citizenry. This polity was thus very different from the absolutist regimes that were emerging in the European countries at the same time, but also very different from the representative democracies that appeared two or three centuries later.

It was not a democracy but it was a mixed regime, as Leonardo Bruni rightly concluded. The debate between the “democratic” and the “aristocratic” dimensions was explicit, and we find it both in the archives and in a large number of contemporary analytical works from this period. At the end of the fifteenth century, the old Aristotelian opposition between elections, considered as basically aristocratic, and sortition, that was seen as a democratic tool, seemed to revive in Florentine politics, and was well synthesized in a dialogue by Francesco Guicciardini. The main Tuscan city was a republic, in the sense that it had a largely self-governed citizenry, and the republican ideal that was elaborated in this city-state...
helped to establish a radical tradition of self-government that can be found throughout the history of modern democracy.

**Randomly Selected Mini-Publics and Deliberative Democracy**

During the Early Renaissance, Florence was frequently compared with Athens, and it has played an important role in the development of the modern republican tradition. Our analysis of its political system provides a valuable viewpoint from which to understand the specific features of modern deliberative democracy and the challenges it might have to face.

According to most supporters of participatory instruments based on random selection, the return of this technique in politics, after centuries of eclipse, implies that some of the ideals of ancient democracies are coming back. A good example of this can be found in the writings of Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, two of the most coherent advocates of random selection. They write:

> The assumption behind random selection in politics is that just about anyone who wishes to be involved in decision making is capable of making a useful contribution, and that the fairest way to ensure that everyone has such an opportunity is to give them an equal chance to be involved. Random selection worked in ancient Athens. It works today to select juries and has proved, through many practical experiments, that it can work well to deal with policy issues. For democracy to be strong, it must contain the essential element of citizen participation, not just by a self-selected few but by ordinary people who rightly can determine their own futures. Given the difficulty of involving everyone in such a deliberative process, we argue that random selection is an ideal means by which a cross section of the population can be involved.

For sure, there are evident and huge differences in the social, political, economic and institutional contexts of modern democracies on the one hand, and of Athenian or Florentine Republics on the other. Nevertheless, can we speak of a partial resurgence of the ideal of self-government taking place in the contemporary experiments in deliberative democracy? These experiments might well be signs of a new democratic trend in the early twenty-first century, which could develop further or could remain trapped in a niche. The experiments themselves embody a larger critique of those paternalist traditions that tend to reduce democracy to representative government. Their supporters consider that civic participation in politics is crucial for the good health of our political system. They claim the political equality of all citizens in public discussion and, in some cases, in decision-making. They think that democratic legitimacy is closely linked to the expansion of deliberation in the sense of public debate: the more a decision comes from a lively and well organized public debate, the more it will be legitimate, both normatively and empirically. This line of thought is clearly a response to the growing distrust of the political system by the citizenry, which is a current and significant trend, at least in Europe. In the deliberative democracy corpus, sortition has a visible space.

Nevertheless, it is important to stress the obvious differences between Florence and experiments like the British Columbia Citizen Assembly. In Canada, as in other Western countries, nearly all adults are full citizens. The technique of random selection is not routine, nor part of the normal constitutional device; it is only used at particular moments, when a public authority freely decides to organize a citizen assembly, a citizen jury, a consensus conference or another kind of deliberative device. Until 2010, no law has made sortition mandatory beyond the judicial domain. The political experiments based upon sortition usually operate on the margins of politics, and the British Columbia experiment is the exception rather than the norm.
Representative Sample and Descriptive Representation

A further, less evident but crucial, difference concerns the meaning of random selection. In Florence, as in Athens, sortition and a rapid rotation of the offices enabled citizens to govern and be governed in turn. This is why one can speak of self-government, and this is why, in the classical political thought from Aristotle to Guicciardini, random selection had been associated with democracy and elections with aristocracy. The contemporary use of random selection is quite different. The real chance to be selected in the British Columbia Citizen Assembly or in any other device of this type is very low. The idea, clearly expressed by Lyn Carson and Brian Martin, is to use sortition in order to select a microcosm of the citizenry, a group that has the same features and the same diversity as the citizenry, but at a smaller scale. This would form a “minipopulus,” as Robert A. Dahl first said, or a “mini-public,” which is now the most common term. This possibility is statistically plausible when one takes a representative sample of the citizenry. A group of hundreds of citizen randomly selected tends to be representative of the people. A smaller group of ten to twenty persons, which is the size of most citizen juries, cannot be truly representative, but it incorporates part of the diversity of the people. This fair “cross-section” of the people tends, at a small scale, to be similar to the population at large.

The notion of representative sample is familiar to the twenty-first-century reader based on decades of its intensive use in statistics and opinion polls. This is why it seems “quite rational to see lotteries as a means to the end of descriptive representation.” However, the representative sample is a late 19th century invention. There could be no relation between random selection and descriptive representation in Athens or Florence, where the idea that random selection statistically leads to a cross section of the population was not scientifically available. At that time, chance had not yet been “tamed” in the political sphere.

The “microcosmic” reasoning implies that political representatives have to be the social or cultural mirror of the people. This became important during the age of the French and North-American revolutions. John Adams could write that the legislature “should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large,” Mirabeau argued that the assembly should be “for the nation what a scaled-down map is for its physical area; whether in part or in full, the copy should always have the same proportions as the original.” But because it was impossible to rely on the notion of a representative sample promoters of descriptive representation ignored sortition and put forward other technical solutions. The Anti-federalists proposed small constituencies in order to favor the lower middle-class – a proposal that was not particularly convincing and that was successfully criticized by the Federalists. Another solution suggested the separate representation of different social groups through corporatist methods – a proposal that was too closely identified with the Old Regime to convince radical democrats. In the nineteenth century, the upper classes’ de facto hegemony among representatives regularly lead to the idea of the specific representation of subordinate groups, and particularly of the working class. The representative sample was first introduced in politics with the opinion polls in the middle of the twentieth century, and it only became the instrument for selecting trial juries and various political juries and committees at the end of the nineteen-sixties and in the nineteen-seventies.

Bernard Manin was the first to ask why selection by lot disappeared from the political scene with the modern revolutions. He gave an answer based on two elements. On the one hand, the founding fathers of the modern republics wanted an elective aristocracy rather than a democracy, and so it was logical that they should reject random selection. On the other hand, the theory of consent, deeply rooted in modern conceptions of natural law, had gained so much ground that it seemed difficult to legitimate a political authority not formally...
approved by the citizens of the state. These two arguments are important, but they cannot
tell the whole story. In particular, they fail to explain why radical minority currents did not
demand the use of selection by lot in politics, even though they campaigned for a mirror-like
representation in which the representative body would resemble the people in its entirety. To
understand these developments, one has to point to a number of other factors. We have to
abandon the realm of “pure” political ideas and look at the way in which they take material
shape through techniques of rule and various tools and mechanisms. (In this respect, the
history of political ideas would gain much from the lessons of the social history of science
as it has developed in the last few decades.) The lack of a statistical concept of representative
sampling, at the time of the French and American revolutions when probability calculus was
already well developed, is a decisive reason why political selection by lot seemed doomed in
modern democracies with their large populations – and why those who upheld a descriptive
conception of representation inevitably had to choose other tools to advance their ideals.

Conversely, the question of the present comeback of random selection in a growing
number of experiences also appears open to an answer largely centred on representative
sampling. Random selection as it is practised in politics today is inseparably bound up with
that concept. In modern democracy, the deliberation of a cross section of the people is not
the same as the self-government of the people. It gives everybody the same chance to be
selected; but because this chance is very small, it does not allow all citizens to hold public
office in turn. It leads instead to a mini-public counterfactual opinion that is representative
of what the larger public opinion could be. John Adams could write that the microcosmic
representation he was claiming for “should think, feel, reason, and act” like the people.
For the contemporary politics of presence, the statistical similarity between “descriptive”
representatives and the people is only a starting point. The mini-public has to deliberate,
and in this process, it changes its mind. It begins to think somehow differently, and this is
precisely the added value of deliberation. This is quite clear when we read James Fishkin,
who invented the deliberative poll, one of the techniques of deliberative democracy that uses
random selection:

Take a national random sample of the electorate and transport those people from all over the
country to a single place. Immerse the sample in the issues, with carefully balanced briefing
materials, with intensive discussions in small groups, and with the chance to question
competing experts and politicians. At the end of several days of working through the issues
face to face, poll the participants in detail. The resulting survey offers a representation of
the considered judgments of the public.

When traditional polls consist only in a “statistical aggregation of vague impressions formed
mostly in ignorance of sharply competing arguments,” deliberative polls allow us to know
“what the public would think, had it a better opportunity to consider the questions at
issue.”

Challenges of Deliberative Mini-Publics

Another difference between the Florentine Republic and contemporary randomly selected
bodies is the relation between deliberation and decision-making. The modern schemes based
on random selection tend to reveal a larger dynamic of deliberative democracy. In this paper,
I will not discuss deliberative bodies such as supreme courts or administrative committees
such as the Food and Drug Administration. I will focus instead on deliberative mini-publics.
Schemes of this type offer a number of promises, such as to limit the distance between the
political class and citizenry and to promote better communication between them. At the same time, however, they are confronted with three sets of challenges.

The first one is that the counterfactual opinion can differ from the real opinion of the people. When the proposal of the British Columbia Citizen Assembly was put to the electorate-at-large in a referendum in 2005, it failed to pass the test: because it was considered a constitutional matter, the referendum required approval by 60% of the vote and simple majorities in 60% of the districts in order to pass. Final results indicate that the referendum failed with only 57.7% of votes in favor, although it did have majority support in 77 of the 79 electoral districts. When the proposal was put again in a referendum in May 2009, the gap was even larger: only 38.7% of valid votes and 7 of 85 electoral districts were in favor of the proposal. In Ontario, the Citizen Assembly proposal convinced only a minority of voters and there will be no second chance. In Europe, the PASOK candidate selected by a cross section of Marousi citizens was not the one who won the elections some months later.

The tension between the counterfactual deliberation and the public debate at large seems to be inherent to deliberative democracy, as far as it takes an institutional form. Political theory has recently begun to address it. This tension appears in several dimensions:

(1) **Learning process.** The more the members of a representative sample learn in a Citizen Assembly, the more their knowledge and opinion will differ from the public opinion at large. The most interesting schemes, which lead to a real empowerment of the participants, tend to differ more from the average public opinion than the bad ones.

(2) **Numbers.** When the number of participants grows, the deliberative quality of the discussions tends to decrease.

(3) **Publicity.** Jon Elster and others have shown that the publicity of debates does not necessarily lead to a better discussion. In some contexts at least, a discussion behind closed doors will be of a better quality. Most citizen juries discuss without any audience. In this context, it is more difficult to involve the wider public and to increase its understanding of the case in question. Thus the meetings tend to be schools of democracy for the few, not for the many.

(4) **Learning through discussion or through action.** The deliberative devices are conceived in order to foster and improve political education. However, they usually allow participants to meet only “for a short period, as ordinary citizens for specified and limited purposes,” as Gordon Gibson puts it. In social movements or in NGOs, the deliberative quality is probably lower but the intensity and the emotional commitment of the participants is much higher. In some cases personal ambition, rather than the desire for democratic progress, could even become the main motivating factor.

Deliberative democracy also has to face another set of challenges. Because it focuses on the (deliberative) rule of the game, it often tends to forget or at least to underestimate power relations and the relationship between deliberative schemes and the broader democratic transformation of society at large. Those participatory devices that select individual by lot, without any tie between them, constitute an instrument that is not embedded in actual social relations. It therefore makes it difficult for these mechanisms to change existing power structures. This induces serious difficulties:

(1) **Power in the deliberation itself.** One of the most discussed problems is the influence of power on the deliberative process itself. A formally equal procedure can lead to unequal outputs if it remains blind to the differences in social, economic or cultural capital that strongly influence the input side of the process. This has been widely
discussed and techniques have arisen to reduce social inequalities in deliberation, such as the succession of plenary session and discussions in small groups.

(2) *Top-down and bottom-up*. In addition, most deliberative mini-publics are top-down processes. It is therefore not very probable that radical changes will take place in which the power of those who have set up these instruments would be truly challenged.

(3) *Individual vs. organized citizens*. A lot of deliberative designs, especially those that employ random selection, valorize individual citizens. They consider organized interests, including NGOs and community organizations with some diffidence because they are supposed to defend particular interests. These deliberative instruments can even be used against organized civil society, without which any progressive civic change is hardly conceivable.

(4) *Consensus and dissent*. In consensus conferences, citizen juries and many other devices (although not in deliberative polling), deliberative democracy is supposed to lead to a consensus. But do real changes usually come through consensual arguments? Historically, the progress of justice and democracy has been imposed through huge social struggles, not through reasonable consensual discussions. The deliberative devices often tend to be inhospitable to politicization.

(5) *Argumentation and passions*. As suggested by Jürgen Habermas, a good deliberation is usually considered to favor the force of the better argument. However, in order to make real transformations in a world in which the structural resistances are huge, passions seem necessary; such transformations are hardly the product of mere rational argumentation. Rhetoric and emotions are crucial. In order to be strong enough to regulate the world markets, politics has to make people dream of another world. In this process arguing can only be one dimension among others.

(6) *Deliberative democracy and social justice*. The relation between deliberative democracy and social justice remains unclear. Most of the instruments that deliberative theory has analyzed are linked with movements of emancipation of the subordinate classes or of outsiders groups. Experiments based on random selection barely address the critique of the new forms of inequality that are produced by contemporary capitalism. This has mostly been done in other participatory instruments such as the participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre.

(7) *Enlightened decision-making vs. counter-power*. Lastly, to summarize these points, deliberative democracy based upon mini-publics often tends to be a way of producing a more enlightened decision-making and a more enlightened consent. This is important but hardly enough – and if it does not contribute to the development of counter-powers, interest in deliberative democracy will start to decline.

**The Legitimacy of Random Selection**

There is an apparent trade-off between deliberation in the English meaning (good discussion) and deliberation in the meaning found in Latin languages (decision of a collective body). The deliberative bodies open to ordinary citizens are not usually entitled to make decisions. Among the collective bodies that theorists tend to present as good examples of deliberative democracy, those that are entitled to take decisions, or whose advice is directly integrated with decision-making bodies, are mostly expert commissions such as supreme courts, ethics committees or neo-corporatist bodies. Among those open to “ordinary” citizens, most are only consultative or advisory boards: they are only “weak publics.” Why is this? Is it only a contingent phenomenon? Can we expect this situation to change in the future?
The classical Athenian or Florentine Republics relied on a principle of self-government (combined with the rule of law). Representative democracy relies on another principle, the consent of the people expressed through elections (articulated within the rule of law and human rights). Both strongly rely on the legitimacy of number, and especially on the majority principle. However, an important feature of our political regimes is that a lot of decisions are taken through expert committees. In some cases these committees apply the majority principle; in others they function by consensus. Their legitimacy has a strong epistemic dimension: it relies on expert knowledge and on well-designed procedures that favor good (non public) deliberation.

Mini-publics made up of ordinary citizens selected at random cannot rely on the legitimacy of number nor on the legitimacy of expert knowledge. This is why they are not usually entitled to take decisions. Nevertheless, they have their own kind of legitimacy. First of all, contemporary participatory devices are most often employed in order to enable an enlightened discussion to take place. One of their basic assumptions is that a careful deliberation will lead to reasonable results. This is why the counterfactual opinion tends to be more reasonable than the wider public debate. In fact, the epistemic quality of deliberative devices based on random selection is important.

In addition, deliberative participatory devices may have some epistemic advantages compared to representative government or expert committees. Most deliberative democrats rely on a negative argument, well expressed by John Dewey: “A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all.” This statement can be extended to the political class. Deliberative democrats also propose more positive arguments. One of the most common is that good deliberation needs to include various points of view, so that the range of arguments can be enlarged, and the reasons better balanced. In this line of thought, randomly selected mini-publics tend to be better than participatory devices based on voluntary involvement or on the organized civil society because they rest on a cross section of the people and maximize the epistemic diversity of their deliberation. This is why they can bring something valuable to what is, in fact, a context of increasing complexity.

A third argument for participatory deliberative devices is political. Their promise comes from the fact that discontent is growing against the actual functioning of representative democracies. There is a perceived need to counter the tendency to reduce politics to rhetorical shows, to limit the autonomy of the political class and to make it more accountable to the citizenry. Participatory deliberative devices are instruments that promote better communication between the political class and the citizenry. Those based on a representative sample of the population enable political communication to take place amongst ordinary people and not merely between “professional citizens.”

The fourth argument is also political, but is more radical than the third one. Democratic theoreticians of representative government (as opposed to its elitist advocates) often concede that the best democratic system would be self-government, but add that, because self-government is impossible in the large communities typical of modern democracy, the second-best solution is representative government. One could however argue that: since the best democratic system is self-government; and because self-government is impossible in the large communities typical of modern democracy, the second-best solution is actually to give a voice to counterfactual mini-publics selected by lot. In this way, at least it offers citizens an equal chance to participate in decision-making.

The fifth argument for participatory devices based on a representative sample of the population is impartiality. Elected representatives, experts, and organized interests tend to
be moved by particular interests rather than by the notion of the common good. In contrast, random selection ensures that the large majority (or even nearly everybody, due to the possibility of recusal as in a trial jury) will judge according to what they consider the best for all without taking a partisan stance in any controversy. This advantage of impartiality may be strengthened when the advice or the decision has to be taken by a qualified majority or reached through consensus.

Advising, Controlling, Judging, Deciding

Taking into account these five types of legitimacy that participatory devices based on random selection can claim, what can be said about the potential of these contemporary experiments? When the imperative of impartiality is high in respect to a particular topic, random selection offers a worthwhile method by which to select those who will deliberate. An important distinction has to be made, however. It is interesting to note how Hegel defends the institution of trial jury composed of laypersons. Their participation is justified, he writes, insofar, and only insofar, as what is at stake is not the universal, the right or the law, but a concrete and subjective judgment about a particular case. One can be less strict, but one has to recognize that it is not the same thing to deliberate on concrete particular cases and to enact a law. In particular cases, participatory instruments based on random selection have enough legitimacy to advise, but also, at least in some contexts, to control, to judge, as in trial juries, or even to decide – this has been the case in the Berlin citizen juries that, in 17 neighborhoods, have decided the attribution of half a million euros each to sustain local projects in the frame of the urban renewal policy. This could be developed much further.

On the other hand, in cases where impartiality is crucial but where a law is at stake, as in British Columbia, it would seem promising to couple a proposal made by a Citizen Assembly with a referendum, as was done in the Canadian Provinces – that is, to articulate the mini-pubic with the people at large.

It is undeniable that expert committees have an important role to play in cases that rest on highly technical questions. To ensure impartiality, however, it would be necessary to include laypersons in the decision-making, for example at particular moments in the proceedings, such as in the consensus conference on scientific issues invented in Denmark.

In cases where general political issues are at stake, participatory devices based on random selection do not have enough legitimacy to make the decision: the counterfactual opinion is not the same as an actual self-government. Two options could be considered. The first one is to give these devices a mere consultative function and then let elected representatives decide. The idea is to produce a more enlightened consent and a more enlightened government. This is the mainstream option, and we will probably see many experiences of this kind proposed and adopted in the next decades. An alternative would be to combine mini-publics with larger participatory processes. This would be a movement in the direction of a participatory democracy. It would combine representative government and deliberative democracy with forms of direct democracy.

Conclusion: Deliberative Democracy and Participatory Democracy

The idea of deliberative democracy is an important contribution to the renewal of politics and could improve the efficiency and legitimacy of public policies. It is precisely because we live in a complex world that the need for public deliberation increases. Deliberative democracy can provide a good counter-weight to populist tendencies, and to the domination of charismatic leaders.
Because of its inherent tensions, deliberative democracy cannot stand alone and has to be combined with participatory democracy, which is different and which has something to do with the principle of Republican self-government of early Renaissance Florence. Participatory democracy implies the actual participation of a large proportion of the citizenry in politics, and in particular the involvement of dominated groups. It not only relies on institutional devices, but also on social movements. The good deliberation of the mini-public has to be linked with a better debate in the larger public sphere. This is why the British Columbia scheme, which couples a Citizen Assembly with a referendum, indicates an interesting path.

Deliberative democracy and participatory democracy, even taken together, cannot stand alone. They are part of a broader evolution that modifies the meaning of political representation, and they are dimensions – until now, secondary dimensions – in the development of multilevel governance. The classical division of power between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary has always been an open process, rather than a stable equilibrium. By addressing the limits of representative government, some schemes of deliberative and participatory democracy propose to modify this supposed equilibrium by introducing a fourth power into the equation.

Random selection has a role to play in this process. Coupled with the rapid rotation of the offices, it was crucial in the early Renaissance Florence where it enabled a limited but real self-government to emerge. Contemporary schemes based on random selection rely on the notion of a representative sample, which was unavailable before the end of the nineteenth century. These mini-publics embody a counterfactual opinion – what the larger public could think if it could truly deliberate. They are therefore closely linked to the ideal of deliberative democracy, which is something very different from the Florentine vivere libero. They offer sources of legitimacy that have to be combined with, rather than opposed to, the legitimacy of either representative or direct democracy. While these innovation make the situation more complex, and a good equilibrium is not easy to find, they are promising. It could be worth making some steps further in this direction. For who could claim that the status quo is satisfactory?

NOTES

1. Previous versions of this paper have been presented at various conferences at the Collège de France (Paris), at Amalfi (European Amalfi Prize for Sociology and Social Sciences/University La Sapienza, Roma), Berlin (Hertie School of Governance/Centre Marc Bloch), Bellagio (Rockefeller Foundation/CNRS/Mac Arthur Foundation), and at the IEP Paris. I would like to thank all participants for their useful comments. A special thank to Oliver Dowlen, who has edited a previous English version of this paper.


16. This meaning globally remains the same in contemporary Italian and Portuguese. French and Spanish are somewhere in between. In German, conversely, deliberation excludes decision and a “deliberative Stimme” (a deliberative voice) is only consultative. These semantic differences partly explain the difficult diffusion of the concept of “deliberative democracy” in West European languages other than English. On June 5th, 2009, a brief comparison of the different national versions of Google came up with 208,000 findings for “deliberative democracy” in English, 21,000 for “democracia deliberativa” in Spanish, 17,000 for “demoscracia deliberativa” in Italian, and only 8,000 for “démocratie délibérative” in French or “deliberative Demokratie” in German.
18. Along with the exclusion from citizenship of the working class, one the most important aristocratic features that Leonardo Bruni (“Costituzione politica di Firenze”) mentioned was precisely this point: that the legislative councils could not really discuss nor modify the bills proposed by the Signoria, but only approve or reject them. According to him, the other non democratic elements were that the councils could not decide their own schedule, and that there was no more conscription but a professional mercenary army.
20. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World.
24. This explains the mixed feelings of familiarity and strangeness that we get when reading Machiavelli’s Istorie Fiorentine (see Niccolo Machiavelli, Florentine Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)).
28. Venetian citizenship was basically restricted to the Great Council members: around 1,100 persons for a population of 90,000 at the beginning of the XIVth Century, and 2,600 for a population of 250,000 before the 1575 plague (Frederic C. Lane, Storia di Venezia (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 120, 295–297 and 372).
29. Between 30,000 and 50,000 citizens, for a population of 250,000 to 300,000 people. In both cities, women were excluded from citizenship, but in addition, in Florence, manual workers (the popolo minuto) only had access to citizenship during the revolt of the Ciompi in 1378, when for a few months 13,000 new persons got access to citizenship through the creation of three new guilds; Peasants from the neighborhood (the contado) remained totally excluded, together with the people living in territories under Florentine domination (the dominio).
34. Carson and Martin, Random Selection in Politics, 2, 13–14. The “fair cross section of the community” is the notion that the U.S. Supreme Court referred to when it imposed the reform of trial juries at the end of the 1960s in order to select them by lot among all citizens and not only among a particular group (“The Jury Selection and Service Act,” 28 U.S.C., secs 1861–69, quoted in Jeffrey Abramson, at the end of the 1960s in order to select them by lot among all citizens and not only among a particular group (“The Jury Selection and Service Act,” 28 U.S.C., secs 1861–69, quoted in Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury. The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 100).
42. Sintomer, Le pouvoir au peuple.
44. See among others Mirabeau, “Discours devant les états de Provence.”
45. See among others the “Manifeste des Soixante,” L’Opinion nationale, February 17, 1764, quoted in Rosanvallon, Le peuple introuvable.
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47. Abramson, *We the Jury.*
51. Fishkin, *The Voice of the People,* 162.
52. Ibid.
56. Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere; Between Facts and Norms.*
62. McCormick, “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates.”

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